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MARYLAND V. SHATZER: STAMPING A FOURTEEN-DAY
EXPIRATION DATE ON MIRANDA RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION

Over forty years ago, the United States Supreme Court established a
suspect's right to be informed of his rights to counsel and silence in
Miranda v. Arizona.' Today, Miranda rights inundate American televi-

sions, movie screens, and perceptions of criminal justice. 2 In its controversial decision, the Miranda Court used the Self-Incrimination Clause
of the Fifth Amendment as the foundation for rights of the accused. 3 Although Miranda has been a part of American culture since the decision
was handed down in 1966, the Court is still fine-tuning the application of
Miranda rights.4 Most recently, the Court held in Maryland v. Shatzer5
that a suspect's invocation of the right to counsel is only powerful
enough to prevent further questioning by law enforcement for fourteen
days after the suspect's release from custody.
This Comment explores the flaws, inconsistencies, and impact of
the Shatzer fourteen-day rule. Overall, the Shatzer Court lost sight of the
prophylactic ideas of Miranda in its quest for an easy standardjeopardizing not only the accused's right to counsel but also his right to
remain silent. Furthermore, even though these constitutional rights are
more valuable to suspects today than they were at the time Miranda was
decided, the Shatzer fourteen-day rule continues the Court's pattern of
gradually deteriorating suspects' Miranda rights.
Part I of this Comment briefly describes the Court's development
and clarification of Miranda rights, highlighting the topics most altered
by Shatzer. Part II summarizes the facts, procedural history, and opinions
of Shatzer. Part III asserts four propositions: (1) Shatzer continues the
Court's retreat from the prophylactic principles of Miranda,further compromising the right to remain silent and the right to counsel; (2) the
Court's retreat wrongly abandoned prophylactic measures in favor of
efficiency; (3) the Court's fourteen-day rule compromises a suspect's
Mirandarights at a time when those rights are increasingly valuable and
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) ("Miranda has become embed2.
ded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national
culture.").
3. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458, 467.
See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1994) (holding that a suspect's
4.
request for counsel must be unambiguous); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) (holding that after a suspect has invoked his right to counsel, questioning cannot resume until the suspect
has obtained counsel or the suspect initiates discussion).
5.
130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010).
6. Id. at 1223.
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decisive to his case; and, (4) the Court's focus on the Edwards rule, instead of Miranda rights, makes it easier for the Court to continue to curtail the rights of the accused. This Comment concludes that Shatzer was
wrongly decided, and that the decision will have a detrimental effect on
the fair administration of criminal justice in America.
I. BACKGROUND
Prior to Miranda's landmark ruling in 1966, the only way for a defendant to attack the prosecution's use of his confession made before
indictment or the filing of charges was by bringing a due process claim. 7
A defendant cannot rely on the Sixth Amendment to challenge confessions made during initial interrogations because the right to counselguaranteed by the Sixth Amendment-attaches only when prosecution
formally commences, "whether by way of formal charge, preliminary
hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." 8 Although constitutional challenges under the Due Process Clause remained available to
defendants, the prophylactic measures established by the Miranda Court
provided additional protections to ensure that a suspect's constitutional
rights were fully honored.
However, because the rights guaranteed by Miranda were not explicitly found in the text of the Constitution,9 its holding has been subject
to several challenges-resulting in numerous exceptions to the Miranda
holding. Although the Court has kept Miranda's mandate alive, its pattern of fashioning exceptions to Miranda's application has slowly deteriorated the rights that it previously found indispensible to suspects in
custodial interrogation.
A. TraditionalConstitutionalChallenges to the Admissibility of Statements
The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides
that "[n]o person .. . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." 0 Prior to 1966, the United States Supreme Court
interpreted this right literally to mean that a criminal defendant cannot be
compelled to testify in his own criminal proceeding." Therefore, the
7. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433 ("[F]or the middle third of the 20th century our cases based the
rule against admitting coerced confessions primarily, if not exclusively, on notions of due process.").
8.
Brooks Holland, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 381, 390 (2009) (quoting McNeil v.
Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991)).
9. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966). Although there is no right to be advised of
one's rights in the Constitution, the Constitution's relation to Miranda warnings has been debated by
the Court. Compare Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444 (concluding "that Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively"), with Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 454 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of playing "word games" to make Miranda a constitutional
mandate).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11.
William T. Pizzi & Morris B. Hoffman, Taking Miranda's Pulse, 58 VAND. L. REV. 813,
814-15 (2005) (explaining that prior to the Miranda decision, the United States Supreme Court held
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Self-Incrimination Clause cannot single-handedly protect suspects from
police coercion during interrogations outside of any criminal proceedings
or prevent the admission of any evidence obtained from such coercion at
trial.12 Similarly, the Fifth Amendment could not provide suspects with
counsel during interrogation because the Sixth Amendment alone governed the right to counsel.13
In the mid-twentieth century, the Court became increasingly concerned about coerced confessions obtained through dishonest and threatening police interrogations.14 Although the bare text of the SelfIncrimination Clause did not encompass police tactics prior to trial, the
Court sought to condemn and prevent involuntary confessions 5 by looking to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.16 Unlike voluntary confessions, coerced confessions offend due
process by forcing an individual to incriminate himself, thereby preventing him from attaining a fair trial. Framing the issue around due process, the Court established a totality of the circumstances inquiry to determine the voluntariness of a confession in Johnson v. Zerbst." This
analysis evaluated whether a confession was truly voluntary by determining "whether the defendant's will was overborne at the time he confessed."1 9
While the due process approach afforded defendants broader rights
than the Self-Incrimination Clause, the Due Process Clause had its own
set of limitations. 20 Notably, it did not affirmatively protect suspects
from coercion, but only afforded defendants the opportunity to challenge
any involuntary statements at trial. 21 Furthermore, because interrogations
that a "case" meant the actual criminal proceeding, and "compelled" applied only to a defendant's
right to not be held in contempt for refusing to testify at the proceeding).
12. See Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Ripeness of Self-Incrimination Clause Disputes, 95
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1261, 1317-18, 1323 (2005) (arguing that the United States Supreme
Court violates the Constitution by hearing claims based on the Self-Incrimination Clause before
charges have been filed or a criminal proceeding has commenced because such claims are not yet
ripe for adjudication under the plain language of the Fifth Amendment).
13.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434-35 (2000) ("In Miranda,we noted that the
14.
advent of modem custodial police interrogation brought with it an increased concern about confessions obtained by coercion.").
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458-59 (1966) (tracking the Court's historical disap15.
proval of coerced confessions, which finds its roots in the Star Chamber Oath).
16. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433 ("[F]or the middle third of the 20th century our cases based the
rule against admitting coerced confessions primarily, if not exclusively, on notions of due process.");
see, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S 528, 537
(1963); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958).
17. See Haynes, 373 U.S. at 515; Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 537.
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
18.
19. Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534.
20. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 796 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
21.
Note, ProceduralProtections of the CriminalDefendant- A Reevaluation of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination and the Rule Excluding Evidence of Propensity to Commit Crime, 78
HARv. L. REv. 426, 430-31 (1964) (asserting that only preventing the admission of involuntary
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were often conducted secretly, defendants would struggle to prove the
use of coercive interrogation tactics in court over the contradictory testimony of law enforcement officers. 22 As a result, only extremely visible
instances of police brutality and deceit were found to violate due process.23 Due to concerns about more subtle and sophisticated police tactics
that made coercion often difficult to ascertain, the Court sought additional protections for suspects in custodial interrogation.24
B. Additional Safeguards to the Right againstSelf-lncrimination:
Miranda v. Arizona
In an "unprecedented stretch of the language of the SelfIncrimination Clause," the Miranda Court imposed an affirmative obligation on law enforcement to prevent the occurrence of involuntary
statements. 5 In Miranda, Ernesto Miranda was accused of kidnapping
and rape.26 Miranda was taken into custody and questioned without first
being advised that he had a right to have an attorney present.27 After being interrogated, Miranda eventually confessed. 28 At trial, the State pre29
sented evidence of Miranda's confession over his objection.
In considering whether Miranda's confession was properly admitted
at trial, the Supreme Court addressed "the necessity for procedures which
assure that [an] individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself."30 To set the stage for its landmark holding, the Miranda Court depicted the nature and setting of in-custody interrogations, focusing on
recent studies and case law revealing police brutality during such quesstatements at trial does not provide enough protection to defendants because juries may assume the
parties are debating over a confession when the defense objects to evidence the prosecution attempts
to admit, and the prosecutor's knowledge of a confession, admissible at trial or not, could heavily
influence his decision whether or not to press charges).
22. Id. at 431.
23. See, e.g., Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558-59 (1954) (finding the defendant's confession involuntary because defendant had been questioned on different days for eight hours, fourteen
hours, and twenty-three hours respectively, and during the last session a police psychiatrist, posing
as a medical doctor to treat the suspect's sinus infection, attempted to hypnotize the suspect); Brown
v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 284 (1936) (finding the defendant's confession involuntary because
defendant had been whipped and tortured over several days).
24. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964) (holding that absent the right
to counsel and an opportunity to remain silent, any incriminating statements obtained from a suspect
in custody were inadmissible at trial). The defendant in Escobedo was accused of murder, held in
custody, and not advised of his constitutional rights. Id. at 479, 481. The Escobedo Court found that
any rights lost during interrogation were irrevocably lost and therefore interfered with any rights
guaranteed to the accused during trial. See id. at 486. In other words, the Escobedo Court found that
although the Constitution's language only applied to the courtroom, certain rights could be curtailed
before a defendant ever reached the courtroom. See id.
25. Pizzi & Hoffman, supra note I1, at 815-16.
26. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,491 (1966).
27. Id. at 492.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 439.
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tioning.3 ' The Court was especially concerned with incriminating statements made by defendants who faced more subtle police tactics and "inherently compelling pressures"32 of custodial interrogation that were not
egregious enough to warrant protections under the Due Process Clause.
Thus, the Court returned to the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment in order to provide a more effective set of protections to
defendants in these circumstances. 33
Although the Fifth Amendment does not provide a textual right to
counsel, the Miranda Court considered the right necessary to secure the
explicit privilege in the Self-Incrimination Clause to remain silent. 34 Pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, the right to remain silent was an established principle at the time of Miranda.35 The Miranda Court-aiming to
ensure that a suspect's choice to communicate with the police was voluntary throughout the interrogation process-reasoned that the presence of
an attorney would make a suspect more confident and able to remain
silent if desired.36 The Court found that in order to give meaning to a
suspect's right to silence, "the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation [had] to be diffused by warning the suspect not only of his right to
silence, but of his right to an attorney" as well.3 7 For this reason, the
Court held that the right to counsel, though not a textual right in itself,
was an indispensable companion to the fundamental right to remain silent. 38
C. Effects of Miranda

Miranda'smandate was clear: prior to any questioning, the authorities must warn a suspect that he has the right to remain silent and the
right to an attorney. 39 The Court made equally clear that any questioning
must automatically cease once a suspect invokes his right to remain silent. 40 Similarly, when a suspect invokes his right to counsel, the interrogation cannot continue until counsel is present.4 1 If a suspect cannot ob-

31.
Id. at 445-47; see also id. at 446 n.7 (citing multiple cases involving police brutality). The
Court was particularly disturbed by police manuals that described in detail how to psychologically
disadvantage suspects and extract confessions. Id. at 448-55; see also id at 449 n.8 (referring to
several of the manuals then in use by the police).
32.
Id. at 467.
33.
See id. at 442.
34. Id. at 466; Marcy Strauss, Understanding Davis v. United States, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1011, 1015 (2007).
35.
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (holding that a person has the right "to remain
silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for such silence").

36. Miranda,384 U.S. at 469-70.
37. Donald P. Judges & Stephen J. Cribari, Speaking of Silence: A Reply to Making Defendants Speak, 94 MINN. L. REV. 800, 812 (2010).
38. Id. at 812-13.
39. Miranda,384 U.S. at 444.
40. Id. at473-74.
41.
Id. at474.
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tain an attorney on his own, law enforcement must either accept his decision to remain silent or provide him with counsel.4 2
Adherence to these rules has become a prerequisite for the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant at his criminal trial.4 3 The
Miranda holding "drastically overhauled the law of police interrogations"" by imposing a "positive obligation on police to advise suspects
of a given litany of rights before any custodial interrogation could begin."45 Accordingly, most of Miranda's critics attack the decision for
meddling with law enforcement procedures,46 asserting that it prevents
the admission of voluntary confessions in criminal trials.47 Specifically,
extending the application of Miranda rights may deter police from trying
to obtain voluntary confessions, which are "essential to society's compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the
law." 48 Although a suspect may waive his Miranda rights, the government has the heavy burden of demonstrating that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege. 49 The Court openly acknowledged that it imposed a heavy burden on the government, but
averred that because the government is in a position of authority
throughout the interrogation process, that "burden is rightly on its shoulders." 50 Furthermore, the American criminal justice system places the
burden of proof wholly on the government for every element of a crime,
including proof of the voluntariness of any confession offered as evidence.
D. A "SecondLayer of Prophylaxis": Edwards v. Arizona52
Fifteen years after Miranda,the Court buttressed the accused's right
to counsel in Edwards v. Arizona by clarifying that a custodial interrogation cannot be resumed until the protections articulated in Miranda have
been provided.5 3 In Edwards, the defendant was charged with robbery,
burglary, and first-degree murder. 54 Pursuant to an arrest warrant, Edwards was detained and interrogated by law enforcement officials after
42. Id.
43. Id at 476.
Strauss, supra note 34, at 1014.
44.
45. Pizzi & Hoffman, supra note 11, at 817.
46. See id. at 817 n.20.
47. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1221-22 (2010).
48. Id. at 1222 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 (1991)).
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938) (holding
49.
that the Constitution "imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused")).
50.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
Id. at 460; see also Judges & Cribari, supra note 37, at 806 (noting that in the late eight51.
eenth century to early nineteenth century, American criminal justice switched from an accusedspeaks model to a testing-the-prosecution model).
52. 451 U.S. 477 (1981). The Edwards holding was labeled a "second layer of prophylaxis."
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176 (1991).
53. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85.
54. Id. at 478.
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being properly informed of his Miranda rights. 5 Questioning quickly
ceased after Edwards denied involvement in the crimes and requested to
speak with an attorney. 56 However, when officers visited Edwards at the
county jail the next morning, the jail's guard told Edwards that he "had
to" speak with them. 57 As a result, Edwards spoke to officers and implicated himself in the crimes, even after officers again informed him of his
Mirandarights.
In its review, the Edwards Court considered whether the defendant
had voluntarily waived his right to counsel by speaking with law enforcement at the second interrogation.59 Relying heavily on its rationale
in Miranda, the Court held that the waiver was involuntary and that the
confession was inadmissible at trial. 60 The Court reasoned that once a
suspect initially invokes his right to counsel, any subsequent waivers of
that right are presumed involuntary because such waivers are likely the
result of police coercion, badgering, or dishonesty. 61 Therefore, when
Edwards asserted his right to an attorney on the night of his arrest, the
police were required to honor his desire to communicate with law enforcement only through counsel for the remainder of the investigation. 62
However, the Edwards decision permitted questioning to resume if
the suspect initiated the discussion with law enforcement. 3 The Court
reasoned that where the accused initiated the discussion, the risk of any
police coercion was minimal and the presumption of involuntariness no
longer applied.64 The Court found that the effect of a suspect's assertion
of his right to counsel differed from a suspect's invocation of the right to
remain silent, which only temporarily paused the interrogation.65
Although a seemingly bright-line rule, the Court has since been inundated with proposed exceptions to the Edwards application. In nearly
all of the challenges to Edwards, "[T]he Court was concerned with preserving the clear, bright-line nature of the Edwards decision."6 6 For ex55.
Id.
56. Id. at 479.
57. Id.
58.
Id.
59. Id at 482-84.
60. Id at 487.
61.
Seeid.at484-85.
62. Id at 484-86.
63.
Id. at484-85.
64. See id. at 484-86 & n.9.
65.
Marcy Strauss, The Sounds of Silence: Reconsidering the Invocation of the Right to Remain Silent Under Miranda, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 773, 818-19 (2009) (asserting that invoking the right to counsel has more dire consequences for law enforcement than does asserting the
right to remain silent). CompareEdwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 (holding that when a suspect invokes
the right to counsel, the interrogation must cease and cannot resume until counsel is made available
or the suspect initiates discussion), with Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102-04 (1975) (holding
that although an interrogation must immediately cease upon assertion of the right to remain silent, it
does not follow that law enforcement may not resume questioning two hours later).
66.
Strauss, supra note 34, at 1022.
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ample, the Court applied the Edwards rule to interrogations concerned
with unrelated offenses, forbidding police from questioning a suspect if
he had asserted his right to counsel during a prior interrogation for an
unrelated offense.67 Additionally, the Court applied the Edwards rule
when a suspect had the opportunity to consult with counsel, but did not
have counsel present for questioning.68 For about a decade, the right to
counsel was a powerful and effective protection against deceitful interrogation techniques. Despite several challenges and critiques, Edwards
rendered any police-initiated confessions made after an assertion of the
right to counsel per se involuntary.
E. The Court's GradualRetreatfrom Additional Prophylaxes
Although Edwards secured a suspect's right to counsel, the Court
crafted various exceptions to other aspects of Miranda's application in
the decades following the advent of Miranda rights.
Davis v. United States69 established a notable limitation on
Miranda's application. In Davis, the defendant was accused of murder
and initially waived his Miranda rights during an interview. 70 However,
an hour-and-a-half into the interview, Davis stated that he might want to
speak with a lawyer.71 The defendant's interviewers testified that they
asked Davis if he meant that he wanted a lawyer, to which Davis allegedly answered, "No, I'm not asking for a lawyer." 72 After a short break,
the interview continued for another hour until Davis stated, "I think I
want a lawyer before I say anything else."73 At trial, Davis moved to
suppress statements made during the interview. 7 4 Specifically, Davis
claimed that his statement, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer," constituted
an invocation of his right to counsel, and that based on Miranda and Edwards, the interrogation should have ceased until that right was fully
honored.
In its review, the Davis Court considered how law enforcement officers should respond when a suspect makes a reference to counsel that is
insufficiently clear to invoke the Edwards prohibition on further questioning.76 Stressing the need for effective law enforcement, the Court
held that interrogations may continue unless a suspect clearly and uneArizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S 675, 687 (1988); see also Thomas N. Radek, Note, Arizona
67.
v. Roberson: The Supreme Court Expands Suspects' Rights in the Custodial InterrogationSetting,
22 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 685, 686 (1989).

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146,153 (1990).
512 U.S. 452 (1994).
Id. at 454.
Id. at 455. Specifically, Davis said, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer." Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 459.
See id. at 454.
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quivocally requests an attorney.77 This caveat that a request for counsel
must be unambiguous introduced an element of uncertainty to the Edwards rule and limited its reach. 8 Paradoxically, the Court highlighted
the importance of Miranda rights,79 while making the invocation of those
rights difficult.
Other notable exceptions to Mirandaprovided loopholes for admitting statements obtained without advising a suspect of his rights, as required by Miranda.In Michigan v. Tucker,8 0 the Court held that the exclusion of the "fruits" of a Miranda violation-the statement of a witness
whose identity the defendant revealed while in custody-was not required.8 ' Additionally, the Court ruled in Oregon v. Haas82 that voluntary
statements obtained without advising a suspect of his Miranda rights
could be used to impeach a defendant at trial. In New York v. Quarles,84
the Court created a "public safety" exception that freed law enforcement
from Miranda requirements if questioning needed to occur quickly to
secure the safety of the public.8 5 Despite these exceptions, in Dickerson
v. United States,86 the Court asserted the continued importance and survival of Miranda's core holding when it invalidated an act of Congress
meant to overrule Miranda because Miranda was itself a "constitutional"
holding. In its ruling, the Court rejected the idea that the advisement of
Mirandarights was merely a factor for a court to consider in determining
the voluntariness of a statement.8 8
Although the Court has declined to overrule Miranda, it has begun
to limit the application of the Edwards rule. Prior to its decision in Maryland v. Shatzer, the Court had only broadly recognized a time limit to the
application of the Edwards case, noting, in dicta, that Edwards applied
"assuming there has been no break in custody." 89 The Court would next
have to determine what exactly constituted a "break in custody." The

77. Id at 460-61. In contrast to Mirandaand Edwards, the Davis Court appeared to value law
enforcement efficiency more than rights of the accused. According to Davis, the primary benefit of
Miranda was the advisement of rights. It was then up to the suspect to unambiguously invoke those
rights. See id.
78. See Strauss, supra note 34, at 1027-28.
79. Davis, 512 U.S. at 458.
80. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
81.
Id.at450-52.
82. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
83. Id. at 723-24.
84. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
Id. at 653. In a grocery store, police apprehended a rape suspect known to be carrying a
85.
gun, did not find the gun on his person, and then asked him where he had put the gun. Id at 652. The
suspect answered, "[T]he gun is over there." Id The statement was ruled admissible under a "public
safety" exception. Id at 659-60.
86. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
87.
18 U.S.C. §3501 (2000), invalidatedby Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
88. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 442-44.
89. Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1220 (2010) (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501
U.S. 171, 177 (1991)).
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answer revealed just how far the Court was willing to extend the prophylactic measures it instituted in Miranda and solidified in Edwards.
II.

MARYLAND V. SHATZER

In Maryland v. Shatzer, the United States Supreme Court considered whether a suspect's invocation of his right to an attorney indefinitely shields the suspect from further questioning until he hires or is
provided an attorney. In Shatzer, the defendant was re-interrogated for
the same charge two-and-a-half years after he asserted his right to an
attorney concerning that charge. Although the entire Court agreed that
two-and-a-half years was a sufficient time period for the suspect's invocation of Miranda/Edwardsrights to expire, the majority insisted on pinpointing exactly how long law enforcement must honor a suspect's request for an attorney. Despite criticism from two concurring Justices, the
majority held that a suspect's assertion of his right to an attorney guarded
the suspect from further interrogation without an attorney present for
only fourteen days.
A. Facts
In Shatzer, a detective initially visited the defendant, Michael
Shatzer, Sr., in 2003 to question him about allegations of sexually abusing his own son. 90 At the time, Shatzer was serving a sentence for an
unrelated child sexual-abuse offense at the Maryland Correctional Institution-Hagerstown. 91 When he learned the reasoning behind the detective's visit, Shatzer declined to speak to the detective without an attorney
93
present.92 The detective then ended the visit and closed the case.
Two-and-a-half years later, the case was re-opened based on additional evidence obtained from Shatzer's son. 94 Investigators visited
Shatzer at the Roxbury Correctional Institute, where Shatzer had been
transferred. 95 This time, Shatzer waived his Miranda rights and con96
sented to a polygraph examination. During the interview, he "admitted
to masturbating in front of his son at a distance of less than three feet." 97
Later, after failing the polygraph, Shatzer told police that he "didn't
force" his son to perform fellatio on him, thereby admitting that the act
had occurred. 98 Following this admission, Shatzer requested an attorney
and the detectives ended the interrogation. 99
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id at 1217.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id at 1217-18.
Id.
Id. at 1218.
Id
See id.
Id.
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B. ProceduralHistory
"The State's Attorney for Washington County, Maryland, charged
Shatzer with second-degree sexual offense, sexual child abuse, seconddegree assault, and contributing to conditions rendering a child in need of
assistance."' 00 In response, Shatzer argued that the Edwards protections
rendered his 2006 waiver involuntary and moved to suppress his statements from that day. 01 Shatzer pled not guilty and waived his right to a
jury trial. 102
The trial court denied Shatzer's motion and found him guilty of
sexually abusing his son.103 The Court reasoned that Edwards did not
apply because the two-and-a-half-year time period separating the two
interrogations constituted a sufficient break in custody to allow his previously asserted Miranda rights to expire. 104 The Court of Appeals of
Maryland reversed and remanded, holding that: (1) the passage of time
alone was insufficient to end Edwards protections; and (2) if a break-incustody exception to Edwards existed, Shatzer's release back into prison
did not constitute such a "break in custody." 05 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether, and at what point,
"a break in custody
ends the presumption of involuntariness established
06
in Edwards."'1
C. Majority Opinion
Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court, with Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, and Sotomayor
joining in the decision. 0 7 The majority's main concern was that without
some time limit on Edwards's protections, the effect of a suspect's invocation of the right to counsel would be "eternal," and therefore an acute
burden on the administration of justice. 08 Accordingly, the Court sought
to place an objective, predictable limit on the applicability of Edwards by
employing a cost-benefit analysis of the indefinite protection it provided.1 09
According to the Court, the primary benefit of Edwards was "measured by the number of coerced confessions it suppresse[d] that otherwise

100. Id.
101.
See id
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1218 & n.l (discussing Maryland's filing of a nolle prosequi to the second-degree
sexual offense charge, and consenting to dismissal of the misdemeanor charges barred by the statute
of limitations).
104. Id. at 1218.
Shatzer v. State, 954 A.2d 1118, 1131 (Md. 2008), revd, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010).
105.
106. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1217.
107. Id
108. See id.at 1222.
109. See id. at 1220.
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would have been admitted" at trial."o On the other hand, any voluntary
confessions withheld from evidence constituted a cost paid by society."'
The Court elaborated on the costs by arguing that because Edwards protections apply even where a subsequent interrogation concerns a different
crime,112 or is conducted by a different law enforcement agency," a
repeat offender may escape conviction because he remains protected
after a single unrelated invocation of his rights.1 4 The Court concluded
that with no set limitations, the costs of the Edwards rule outweighed its
benefits." 5
In Shatzer's case, the Court found that the two-and-a-half year
break in custody was sufficient to make his subsequent waiver voluntary." 6 However, the Court then questioned whether a period of one year
or one week would have been sufficient.117 The Court held that it would
be impractical to leave these answers unresolved and established a clearcut rule that a fourteen-day break in custody was sufficient to end the
presumption of involuntariness established in Edwards."8
Although the fourteen-day limitation appeared with little explanation, the Court justified the rule in two ways. First, the Court reasoned
that the need for the Edwards protections lessened where a suspect returned to "normal life."ll 9 A return to normal life, the Court noted, increased the likelihood that the suspect would have consulted with
friends, family, or an attorney, and decreased the likelihood that a waiver
was the result of badgering or coercion by law enforcement officers.120
The Court found that two weeks was a sufficient amount of time to constitute a return to normal life.121 Second, the Court asserted that a suspect
would still be protected under Johnson v. Zerbst,122 which mandated a
totality of the circumstances inquiry into the voluntariness of a confession.123 While the Court acknowledged that it was unusual for the Court
to set precise limits governing police action, it asserted its prerogative to
its fourteen-day rule over
clarify its own legal mandatel24 and instituted
25 and Justice Stevens. 126
Thomas1
Justice
of
criticism
biting
the
110. Id.
I11.
See id
112. See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 687-88 (1988).
113. See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153-54 (1990).
114. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1222.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at1223.
119. Id.at1221.
120. Id.
121.
Id. at 1223.
122. Id. at 1223 n.7.
123. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
124. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1220 ("We have frequently emphasized that the Edwards rule is not
a constitutional mandate, but judicially prescribed prophylaxis.").
125.
See infra Part II.D.
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The Court also considered judicial and law enforcement efficiency
in its determination.127 The Edwards bright-line rule conserved judicial
resources that would otherwise be dedicated to determining the voluntariness of a suspect's waiver.128 By establishing another clear-cut rule,
the Shatzer Court was able to maintain efficiency while restricting Edwards's application.129 The Court strengthened its holding by identifying

those hardships on law enforcement that the fourteen-day rule would
alleviate, increasing the admissibility of voluntary confessions. 30 Specifically, the Court reasoned that police investigations are more effective
if officers "know, with certainty and beforehand, when renewed interrogation is lawful."l 3 '
Last, the Court addressed whether release back into the general
prison population constituted a release from custody for Edwards and
Miranda purposes. 132 Because prisoners retain some control over their
lives, are often able to communicate with others, and the interrogator has
no power over the incarceration, the Court answered the question in the
affirmative.133 Thus, the Court defined "normal" as merely returning to
the state of life enjoyed by the suspect immediately before the interrogation. The Court held that as long as the suspect was not in "interrogative
custody," meaning isolated with his accusers, release back into the general prison population constituted a break in custody for purposes of
Miranda and Edwards.134
D. Justice Thomas's ConcurringOpinion
Justice Thomas, concurring in part and in the judgment, criticized
the majority's bright-line fourteen-day rule. Thomas immediately made
clear his disagreement with any extension of the Edwards rule beyond
the narrow facts of that case.135 He then argued that even if Edwards applied in Shatzer's case, the majority's rule was arbitrary, incomplete, and
inefficient.136
Furthermore, Justice Thomas maintained that the new fourteen-day
rule was unnecessary because Zerbst mandated a totality of the circum126. See infra Part II.E.
127. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1220.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1223-24 ("Now, in cases where there is an alleged break in custody, they simply
have to repeat the inquiry for the time between the initial invocation and reinterrogation. In most
cases that determination will be easy. And when it is determined that the defendant pleading Edwards has been out of custody for two weeks before the contested interrogation, the court is spared
the fact-intensive inquiry into whether he ever, anywhere, asserted his Miranda right to counsel.").
130. Id. at 1223.
Id. at 1222-23.
131.
132. Id. at 1224.
133. Id.
134. Id. at1224-25.
135. Id. at 1227 (Thomas, J., concurring).
136. See id. at 1227-28.
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stances test, which accounted for any time lapse, to determine the voluntariness of a waiver.' 37 In addition, Justice Thomas disagreed with the
majority's conclusion that the fourteen-day rule would aid police investigations.'38 Specifically, Justice Thomas stated, "Determining whether a
suspect was previously in custody, and when the suspect was released,
may be difficult without questioning the suspect, especially if state and
federal authorities are conducting simultaneous investigations." 39 Last,
Justice Thomas accused the majority of valuing certainty and ease of
application over well-reasoned, substantive conclusions.140
E. Justice Stevens's ConcurringOpinion

Justice Stevens, also concurring in the judgment, attacked the fourteen-day rule mainly on public policy concerns. He asserted that any
bright-line rule was unsatisfactory because "[n]either a break in custody
nor the passage of time ha[d] an inherent, curative power" to establish
genuine voluntariness.141 Justice Stevens argued that a suspect may assume that his requests for counsel have been ignored if he is reinterrogated after two weeks without having obtained counsel, and may
assume he has no choice but to submit to the interrogation.142 Moreover,
Justice Stevens maintained that the police will be motivated "to delay
formal proceedings, in order to gain additional information by way of
interrogation after the time limit lapses." 43
Justice Stevens also addressed the dangerous implications of the
fourteen-day rule for suspects already in prison. First, Justice Stevens
argued that because prisoners are summoned by guards to interrogation,
they may assume that the guards and police are not independent, and feel
forced to surrender to the questioning.144 Next, Justice Stevens asserted
that the fourteen-day rule could encourage officers or guards to badger
imprisoned suspects, who will not have the opportunity to overcome the
pressures from the interrogation. 145 Although Shatzer did not claim any
disparate treatment by prison officials or guards between his two interrogations, 146 Justice Stevens was concerned with this "troubling set of incentives for police."l147 Last, because a suspect is already in custody, po137. Id. at 1227 n.1 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966)).
138. See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1228 n.2.
139. Id
140. Id. at 1228.
Id. at 1234 (Stevens, J., concurring).
141.
142. Id at 1229.
143. Id at 1231.
144. Id. at 1233 ("Prisoners are uniquely vulnerable to the officials who control every aspect of
their lives; prison guards may not look kindly upon a prisoner who refuses to cooperate with police.
And cooperation is frequently relevant to whether the prisoner can obtain parole.").
145. See id. at 1232 (asserting that a prisoner's freedom is "severely limited," making it unlikely that a suspect in prison has communicated with friends, family, or an attorney within fourteen
days after questioning).
146. Id at 1225 (majority opinion).
147. Id at 1233 n.13 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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lice have no need to formally place the suspect under arrest and can
"comfortably bide their time, interrogating and reinterrogating their suspect" with little or no evidence of guilt, until the suspect surrenders and
incriminates himself.148
III. ANALYSIS
The Shatzer fourteen-day rule confirms the Court's retreat from the
prophylactic measures established in Miranda and Edwards. This retreat
jeopardizes a suspect's rights to counsel and to remain silent. With
Shatzer, the Court continued its gradual abandonment of Miranda's protections by valuing efficiency above individual rights. Distressingly, this
abandonment arrives at a time when Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights
are increasingly more valuable to suspects. And while suspects are most
in need of those rights, the Court's recent focus on Edwards makes it
easier to curtail suspects' rights, making the Shatzer opinion more detrimental to suspects today. The Court's continued limitation of Miranda
rights is logically unsound, wrongly focused, and inconsistent with the
modern realities of criminal justice.
A. The Court'sRetreatfrom the ProphylacticIdeals of Miranda and
Edwards
The Court's recent retreat from prophylactic tenants overlooks the
general concerns that guided the Miranda Court forty years ago. Relying
on Miranda's assertions, the Shatzer Court noted that a set of prophylactic measures was necessary to protect suspects from the "'inherently
compelling pressures' of custodial interrogation." 49 "Inherently compelling" pressures denoted an inescapable characteristic of interrogation that
generated psychological pressures and uncomfortable experiences for
individuals under interrogation. Accordingly, the Court recognized some
degree of psychological pressure present in all custodial interrogations.so
In Edwards, the Court recognized that these inherent pressures build
with subsequent interrogations. '1' As such, Edwards held that waivers of
the right to counsel occurring after a previous invocation of that right are
presumed involuntary.'5 2 Concerned with genuine voluntariness, the Edwards Court likely declined to place a limit on the time between interrogations because every person will react to, and overcome, any coercive
techniques differently and within varying timeframes. Edwards adhered
to the Miranda Court's concerns about inherent pressures by holding that

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id. at 1219 (majority opinion) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,467 (1966)).
See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1219.
See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,483-84 (1981).
See id at 484-85.
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an inherent characteristic does not fade with time, and no generalizations
about individual triumph over coercion would prove effective.
However, the Shatzer Court imported its own determination of the
time it takes a suspect to overcome coercive effects of an interrogation
and make a voluntary waiver: fourteen days.' 5 3 That is all it takes to
eliminate coercive psychological pressures, according to the Court.154
The Court admits that pressures will still exist during subsequent interrogations, but assumes that the degree of pressure felt by a suspect after a
two-week break in custody will never be more than the pressure felt at
any prior custodial interrogations.' 5 5 This assumption ignores the likely
possibility that an individual will feel more pressured after a second,
third, or tenth interrogation because he feels hunted and badgered by
police.
Because pressure naturally builds in this way, the Court's estimation that pressure will only increase in "narrow circumstances" where no
break in custody has occurred is flawed.'5 6 Though the Court contends
that repeated interrogation attempts will increase the likelihood that a
suspect will again assert his right,157 it is more likely that a suspect will
feel his requests have been ignored and he has no option but to talk.' 58
Feeling that his rights have been ignored naturally increases pressure
because the suspect will feel that he cannot trust his questioners. Logically, a break in custody will not always place a suspect in the same, or
better, position than he was at the initial meeting.
Not only did the Shatzer Court discount and misapprehend the
meaning of inherent pressures, it also erroneously failed to account for
variances in individual personalities, experiences, and understandings of
the criminal justice system. Miranda sought to provide "individuals the
tools to counter inherently coercive pressure by asserting their right not
to deal with the police alone."' 59 However, although every suspect is
given the same "tool" by being read the same rights, every individual has
varying capacities to use this tool. For example, providing every American with a fishing pole does not mean that every American eats fish for
dinner that night. Some Americans will have no clue what to do with the
contraption, others will be scared of the sharp hook and live bait, and

153. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1223.
154. Id. at 1222-23.
155. Id. at 1223 ("It seems to us that period is 14 days. That provides plenty of time for the
suspect to get reacclimated to his normal life, to consult with friends and counsel, and to shake off
any residual coercive effects of his prior custody.").
156. Id. at 1226; see id. at 1231-32 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 1226 (majority opinion) (arguing that if a break in custody has not changed the
157.
suspect's mind about having counsel present, he will know from experience that he need only ask for
counsel for the interrogation to cease).
158. Id. at 1229 (Stevens, J., concurring).
159. Strauss, supra note 65, at 815.
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others still will be physically unable to maneuver the device because of
age or disability.
A rule based on blanket generalizations is directly opposed to the
core of Miranda's analysis. The Miranda Court strongly asserted that
"the privilege against self-incrimination applies to all individuals."6 0 In
fact, Miranda declared that the Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental that the defendant's "age, education, intelligence, or prior contact
with authorities" should have no bearing on his ability to exercise his
rights.'6 1 This reasoning accorded with the Court's earlier holding in
Zerbst that "[t]he determination of whether there has been an intelligent
waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular
facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background,
experience, and conduct of the accused."l 62
Interestingly, the Court made the same mistake in Davis when it declared that a suspect's invocation of the right to counsel must be unambiguous.1 6 3 Numerous scholars argue that the Davis rule will have a disproportionate effect on females and minorities.164 Specifically, women
and minorities are far more likely to use indirect speech patterns such as
"maybe" and "I think." 65 Therefore, by failing to account for linguistic
variances in certain segments of the population, Davis arbitrarily denied
some individuals the right to counsel.166
Despite precedent that acknowledged and protected individual abilities, the Court ignored this principle in Davis and Shatzer. With its fourteen-day rule, the Shatzer Court took Miranda's and Edwards' concern
with genuine, individual voluntariness and replaced it with a blanket
generalization about human reaction to subsequent or repeated interrogation techniques. The Shatzer Court expressed this generalization as the
suspect returning to "normal life." 67 However, the emphasis on a return
to normalcy is troublesome because even if a suspect is placed back at
equilibrium, inherent pressures will still revisit him during subsequent
interrogation. And if he felt unwilling or unable to communicate to his
interrogators without counsel the first time, the return of these pressures
will probably restore, or even enhance, that feeling.

160.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,472 (1966) (emphasis added).
161.
Id. at 468-69.
162. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938).
163. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
164. Strauss, supra note 34, at 1030 (citing David Aram Kaiser & Paul Lufkin, Deconstructing
Davis v. United States: Intention and Meaning in Ambiguous Requests for Counsel, 32 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 737, 759 n.69 (2005) ("[T]he actual linguistic practices of many women and minorities
preclude them from meeting the standard of clarity demanded by Davis.")).
165. Strauss, supranote 34, at 1030-3 1.
166. Strauss, supra note 34, at 1031.
167. Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1221 (2010) (majority opinion).

306

DENVER UNI VERSITY LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 88:1

The Court's retreat from prophylactic measures compromises not
only a suspect's right to counsel, but also his right to remain silent. "The
right to counsel exists only to protect the right to remain silent," as the
Miranda Court considered the former as a means to protect the latter.
Consequently, any limitations on the right to counsel also limit the right
to remain silent. Shatzer's limitation of the right to counsel may also spur
nationwide decisions similarly limiting the right to remain silent. Although courts have largely considered the two rights as separate and distinct standards,' 69 nine out of eleven circuits and the District of Columbia
have applied the Davis standard for invoking the right to counsel to the
right to remain silent.o7 0 Similarly, Shatzer's limitation of the right to
counsel may be applied in cases concerning the right to remain silent.
Admittedly, because the right to remain silent is already quite limited,' 7'
Shatzer's fourteen-day rule would actually bolster that right. But the underlying trend of Shatzer and Davis-limiting the prophylactic protections awarded by Miranda and Edwards-is a dangerous ideal to transport into cases involving the right to remain silent. Courts may use
Shatzer's fourteen-day rule to proportionally limit the time lapse required
to spoil a suspect's invocation of the right to remain silent. And any additional limitations on the right to remain silent may evaporate the right
entirely.
B. The Shatzer Court Wrongly Abandoned ProphylacticMeasures in
Favorof Efficiency
The Shatzer Court held that it would be "impractical" to leave Edwards's application open for clarification on a case-by-case basis, partly
for judicial efficiency 72 and partly to ensure that law enforcement officers know for certain when renewed interrogation is lawful. 73 Though
the importance of judicial efficiency is debatable, it is beyond the scope
of this Comment.174 Nevertheless, the Court placed too much emphasis

168. Strauss, supra note 65, at 817.
169. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
170. Strauss, supra note 65, at 784-85 (citing Valle v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 459 F.3d
1206, 1213-15 (11 th Cir. 2006); United States v. Nelson, 450 F.3d 1201, 1211-12 (10th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Sherrod, 445 F.3d 980, 982 (7th Cir. 2006); McGraw v. Holland, 257 F.3d 513, 519
(6th Cir. 2001); Simmons v. Bowersox, 235 F.3d 1124, 1131 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Anderson, No. 95-3048, 1996 WL 135720 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 1996) (per curiam)).
171.
See supra note 65, and accompanying text.
172. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1222-24 (finding that the fourteen-day rule would conserve judicial
resources by making the determination of voluntariness "easy" if a suspect has been out of custody
for two weeks or longer).
173. See id at 1222-23.
174. The Court has often expressed its preference for bright-line rules over totality of the
circumstances approaches. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994) ("[I]f we were
to require questioning to cease ifa suspect makes a statement that might be a request for an attorney,
this clarity and ease of application [set forth in Edwards] would be lost."); Minnick v. Mississippi,
498 U.S. 146, 151 (1990) ("The merit of the Edwards decision lies in the clarity of its command and
the certainty of its application.").
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on ensuring ease of application for law enforcement, and abandoned its
dedication to prophylactic measures established in Miranda.
After the Court barely kept the core of Miranda's holding alive in
Dickerson, it once again turned its back on one of Miranda's main principles: that law enforcement's investigative powers, though valuable to
society, are limited by the rights of the accused guaranteed in the Sixth
Amendment.175 Individual rights should not and do not have to be compromised to establish an effective system of law enforcement.176 The
Miranda Court acknowledged the importance of police investigations
and interrogations but refused to abridge constitutional rights to make the
prosecutor's job a little easier. 177 With Shatzer, the Court tipped the
scales in the opposite direction based on a flawed focus on efficiency.
Contrary to the Court's assertion, the fourteen-day rule is not necessary to ensure the fair and effective administration of justice. The original Edwards rule did not prevent all confessions. If a suspect wishes to
make a voluntary confession, he may do so even after invoking his
rights, as Edwards allows questioning to resume if a suspect initiates the
discussion. And because only twenty percent of suspects invoke their
rights,'7 9 Edwards ultimately has no effect on a vast majority of cases,
and the number of confessions that may be suppressed is slim. Moreover,
the Court's fixation with law enforcement is unfounded and contrary to a
fair criminal justice system. In a just system, law enforcement should not
"have to fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he
will become aware of, and exercise, these rights."' 80 The mere fact that
law enforcement fears a suspect's exercise of his fundamental rights is
unsettling.
In fact, those fears may not be legitimate. Despite the Court's intentions in Miranda, false confessions are still prevalent,' 8 ' showing that the
numerous exceptions to Miranda have provided law enforcement with
sufficient loopholes to continue to practice coercive tactics during interrogations. Although it is now well established that physical abuse is an
illegal tactic to extract confessions, the line between acceptable psychological techniques and psychological coercion that is a violation of the
Constitution remains blurred.18 2 The fourteen-day rule, along with the
175.
Holland, supranote 8, at 390.
Strauss, supra note 65, at 773 (quoting Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964) ("If
176.
the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement,
then there is something very wrong with that system.")).
177. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479-81 (1966).
178. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).
179. Strauss, supra note 65, at 774.
180. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
181.
Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1060
(2010).
182. See Laura Hoffman Roppe, True Blue? Whether Police Should Be Allowed to Use Trickery and Deception to Extract Confessions, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 729, 732 (1994).
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Court's progeny of exceptions to Miranda, has informed law enforcement officers of exactly how much questionable behavior they can legally employ.
Specifically, Shatzer's rule will actually aid law enforcement in extracting confessions from suspects in custody because those suspects will
be susceptible to incessant re-questioning every two weeks, even if they
properly assert their right to counsel. Those people unable to make bail
for whatever reason will therefore be more detrimentally impacted by the
fourteen-day rule than will the rest of society. Hence, the rule will be
arbitrarily more harmful to certain individuals with no justification.
Ultimately, by continuing to institute exceptions and limitations to
the application of Miranda rights, the Court is instituting a dangerous
pattern that actually helps police engage in trickery and coercion. Nonetheless, the Shatzer decision continued the Court's precedent of chipping
away at Miranda rights to satisfy concerns about effective law enforcement. Moreover, as law enforcement officers become more clever and
confident in their techniques, suspects struggle to assert and protect their
fundamental rights, which are particularly critical in today's criminal
prosecutions.
C. Why Fifth and Sixth Amendment Rights are More Important to Suspects Today
The Shatzer fourteen-day rule limited a suspect's rights at a time
when a suspect's pretrial rights are becoming increasingly critical to the
outcome of his case. Approximately ninety percent or more of today's
criminal trials are resolved by negotiated disposition rather than trial,
meaning defendants "rarely face their accusers during traditional courtroom proceedings that pit skilled trial lawyers against each other."183
This is a recent development in criminal law that differs from the reality
the Court faced at the time of Miranda. Specifically, between 1980 and
2002, the rate of federal criminal cases concluded by a bench and jury
trial fell from 23 percent to 4.8 percent.' 84 So today, pretrial contexts,
such as interrogation settings, are the stage for judgment, where damage
can be minimized, bargains can be struck, and cases can be won or
lost.185 In fact, only in rare cases does the "compulsion" sought to be
protected by the Fifth Amendment occur at trial.18 6
This modem reality makes a suspect's right against selfincrimination incredibly valuable, as there may not be a trial to argue the
Holland, supra note 8, at 382.
183.
184.
Frank 0. Bowman, III, Response, American Buffalo: Vanishing Acquittals and the Gradual Extinction of the Federal Criminal Trial Lawyer, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 226, 226
(2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/i 1-2007/Bowman.pdf.
185.
Holland, supra note 8, at 382-83.
186. Manheimer, supra note 12, at 1265.
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voluntariness of a statement. Even more troubling for suspects, the rate
of acquittal has declined alongside the falling rate of criminal trials.' 87
The declining rate of acquittals has been attributed to the enactment of
the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which provided prosecutors
more bargaining leverage.' 8 8 Thus, suspects are at a disadvantage from
the initiation of the investigation because the interrogation context is
increasingly more influential to the result of their case, and prosecutors
have increased bargaining power. And at this time when pretrial contexts
are especially valuable to suspects, the Court is continuing to curtail the
pretrial rights of the accused.
The trend of modem criminal prosecution also clouds the line separating Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections, which further increases a
suspect's need for prophylactic protections that transcend the bare text of
the Constitution. Unlike the Fifth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment
textually guarantees a suspect's right to counsel in a "criminal prosecution."18 9 This right need not be invoked, but automatically takes effect
when prosecution commences.19 0 However, this right does not attach
until the "critical stage" of the proceedings, which can include postcharge interrogations and lineups.191 Today, as initial and pre-charge
interrogations grow increasingly influential in criminal prosecutions, the
definition of this "critical stage" is changing. While the increasingly
blurred line between the critical and non-critical stage of criminal prosecution would support stronger rights earlier in the process, the Court has
done the opposite. Ignoring the realities of modem criminal prosecution,
the Court has made the right to counsel harder to invokel92 and more
difficult to maintain. 193
D. How the Court's Focus on Edwards Makes it Easierfor the Court to
CurtailSuspect Rights
The Shatzer Court confidently flexed its muscles by declaring its
prerogative to alter its own "judicially prescribed prophylaxis."' 94 The
Shatzer Court justified its drastic limitation on individual rights by pro-

187. Bowman, supra note 184, at 227.
Bowman, supra note 184, at 226-27 (citing Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the
188.
End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 101-06 (2005) (presenting
data to support the assertion that the post-1987 federal sentencing system consisting of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines provided prosecutors more bargaining leverage, directly resulting in
the declining number of acquittals)).
189. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
190. Holland, supra note 8, at 390.
191.
Id. (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,428 (1986)).
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (holding that a suspect's invocation of
192.
the right to counsel must be unambiguous to halt the interrogation).
193.
Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1223 (2010) (holding that a suspect's assertion of
his right to counsel forbids police from interrogating the suspect again for fourteen days if he has not
obtained counsel).
194.
Id. at 1220.
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claiming that the Edwards rule is not a constitutional mandate.19 5 But
only a decade ago in Dickerson, the Court avoided overruling Miranda
by declaring unconstitutional an act of Congress that purported to reduce
Miranda warnings to a mere factor for consideration in determining the
voluntariness of a statement.' 9 6 Critical to the Dickerson Court's reasoning was that Miranda was a "constitutional decision" of the Court, which
may not be overruled by an act of Congress.1 9 7 Although the Dickerson
Court qualified its decision by explaining that constitutional rulings are
not immutable, but are subject to judicial modification,' 98 the Court explicitly classified Miranda as a "constitutional decision." 99 Only ten
years after this controversial classification, the Shatzer Court declared
that Edwards, a direct offspring of Miranda,200 is not a constitutional
mandate.2 0 1
Because Edwards and Miranda are so intimately related, this shift is
not fully justified. The Edwards opinion simply reconfirmed 20 2 the
Miranda mandate that an accused has a constitutional right to have coun203
sel present during custodial interrogation. The Edwards Court aimed to
provide "substance" to Miranda and its progeny, and emphasized that it
is inconsistent with Miranda for police to reinterrogate a suspect in custody after he has clearly asserted his right to counsel.2 04 Therefore, the
Edwards rule was fashioned completely on Miranda's heels, and if one
rule is a constitutional mandate, the other should be as well.205
Characterizing Edwards as merely a judicially created prophylaxis
increases and assists the Court's ability to further curtail suspect rights.
By switching its focus from Miranda to Edwards, the Shatzer Court has
found an easier way to limit rights of the accused. Specifically, limiting
the Edwards rule is easier than limiting the Miranda rules because by
classifying the Edwards rule as a judicial prophylaxis instead of a constitutional rule, the Court need not defend its limitations on that prophylaxis, as it did with Mirandain Dickerson.2 06

195.
196.

Id.
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000).

197.

Id.

198.
Id. at 441.
199. Id. at 432.
200. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1219-20 (describing the advent of the Edwards rule as an expansion
of Miranda rights).
201.
Id at 1220.
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,485 (1981).
202.
203. Id at 482.
204. Id at 485.
205. See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1228 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The source of the holdings in
the long line of cases that includes both Edwards and Miranda, however, is the Fifth Amendment's
protection against compelled self-incrimination applied to the 'compulsion inherent in custodial'
interrogation . .. .").
206. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 439-44 (2000).
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CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court began running with the idea of
additional safeguards for the accused in Miranda and Edwards, but
tripped over those safeguards with Davis and eventually fell backwards
with Shatzer. In Shatzer, the Court correctly asserted its prerogative to
clarify and constrain its own prophylactic creations, but lost sight of its
concurrent responsibility to protect individual rights, albeit those the
Court itself has created. By focusing on the Edwards rule instead of
Miranda rights generally, the Court was able to create the fourteen-day
rule with minimal constitutional challenge, although the changing process of criminal justice makes Edwards' prophylactic measures more
closely related to explicit constitutional rights.
Consequently, the Court ignored the realities of the modem criminal
prosecution process and drastically limited Miranda rights at a time
when suspects need them the most. The Court, and Justice Thomas in his
concurrence, ask their audience to find solace in Zerbst protections still
available to defendants. 20 7 But because Zerbst predates Miranda by
twenty-eight years, it can be argued that Miranda replaced the need for
Zerbst, meaning that Shatzer was the Court's last opportunity to salvage
Miranda rights. Given this opportunity, the Court not only constricted
the accused's right to counsel, but also jeopardized his right to remain
silent.
Given the Court's flawed reasoning, detrimental impact, and inconsistency with the realities of modem criminal prosecutions, Shatzer was
wrongly decided and will hinder the fair administration of criminal justice in America.
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Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at -1227 n.l (Thomas, J., concurring).
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